Motivation for
the Research
It has been extensively documented that the level of financial development,
however measured, varies greatly across countries. However, the ranking of countries
varies through time. Our theories of financial development need to explain both
the relatively high persistence in degree of financial depth as shown in key
indicators and the non-trivial changes in the ranking across countries at different
moments in time. Existing theories-which rely on stable and largely predetermined
institutional features-successful as they are in explaining the cross-sectional
Research Approach
This paper builds on the premise that
a well-developed financial system enhances competition in
the industrial sector by allowing easier entry.
The authors document this fact by showing that both aggregate manufacturing-sector
price-cost margins and average firm size-representing
measures of incumbents' rents or the inverse of the degree of competition in
an industry-are significantly negatively correlated with financial development
across countries. They show, however, that there is important heterogeneity in
The authors split industries into two equal-sized groups, according to whether the benefits of easier access to external finance outweigh the costs of increased competition, and call them the promoters and opponents of financial development, positing that the relative strength of each group determines the equilibrium level of financial system sophistication. Absent significant perturbations to this political economy equilibrium, they do not expect significant changes in financial development.
Trade liberalization is a perturbation to the relatively high persistence of private credit. The paper uses an event study and regression analysis to study the change induced by trade liberalization in the relative strength of promoters across 41 trade-liberalizing countries to see whether this is a good predictor of subsequent financial development.
Key Findings
Implications
Although deep institutional reasons
play a role, to an important extent countries have the level
of financial development they
choose. Policy convergence to best-practice standards is not
likely to
happen automatically unless the political-economic conditions
for such a change are
present.
Policies that on average have a liberalizing effect on markets are not by themselves enough to guarantee their extension to the financial system. They can even worsen the situation. In this context, understanding the interrelation between sectoral reforms and adjusting the timing accordingly seems of first-order importance.