

# Data Security Risks: RFID Lab Research

**Kevin Fu**

**kevinfu@cs.umass.edu**

Assistant Professor

Department of Computer Science

University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA

**[www.rfid-cusp.org](http://www.rfid-cusp.org)**

# RFID tags in a nutshell

- Originally simple bar code replacement
- Now are mini, low-power computers

Identify a class  
of product



Identify a  
particular item



# RFID tags in a nutshell


- Originally simple bar code replacement
- Now are mini, low-power computers
- Applications
  - ▶ Public transportation
  - ▶ Pharmaceutical anti-counterfeiting
  - ▶ Medical safety
  - ▶ E-commerce

# Wide variety of RFID tech

- Low-frequency tags
  - ▶ Car immobilizer, human implants



- High-frequency tags
  - ▶ **Credit card**, passport, subway pass



- Ultra-high-frequency tags
  - ▶ Supply chain, EZPass toll



# Japan Public Transportation

Current Balance



SFCard Viewer

¥473

関連サイト    メニュー

利用年月日	入場駅	出場駅	残額	メモ
2006/06/03			\$473.00	物販
2006/06/02	JR東 新横浜	JR東 菊名	\$593.00	
2006/06/02	JR東 秋葉原	JR東 東京	\$723.00	窓出
2006/06/02	JR東 渋谷	JR東 上野	\$853.00	
2006/06/02	JR東 渋谷		\$1,043.00	現金チャージ
2006/06/01	JR東 秋葉原	JR東 渋谷	\$43.00	
2006/06/01	JR東 渋谷	JR東 秋葉原	\$233.00	
2006/05/29	JR東 舞浜	JR東 渋谷	\$423.00	
2006/05/29			\$673.00	入場・物販
2006/05/29	JR東 東京	JR東 舞浜	\$950.00	
2006/05/28	JR東 新宿	JR東 渋谷	\$1,180.00	
2006/05/28	JR東 上野	JR東 新宿	\$1,310.00	
2006/05/28	JR東 渋谷	JR東 渋谷	\$1,500.00	窓出
2006/05/28			\$1,500.00	現金チャージ

Entrance and exit date and station



Details of merchandise purchase




Beginning Balance



# RFID Applications from the Lab

# espress pay



# Case Study: RFID Credit Cards

# What are RFID Credit Cards?

- **“No-swipe”** credit card
- “fastest acceptance of new payment technology in the history of the industry.”

[VISA; As reported in the Boston Globe, August 14<sup>th</sup> 2006]



# What do RFID CCs Reveal?

 **FIRST BANK  
OF WIKI**

3712 345678 95006

VALID  
DATES

07/02 THRU 07/07

MEMBER  
SINCE

02

JOHN JONES

- Credit card number
- Expiration date
- Cardholder name

# The New York Times

## Researchers See Privacy Pitfalls in No-Swipe Credit Cards

By JOHN SCHWARTZ

Published: October 23, 2006

 E-MAIL



MASTERCARD COMMERCIAL




# Replay: Credit Card Cloning

- Some cards send same data for different transactions
- Our device replays the radio conversation



I'm Kevin's Card.  
I'm Kevin's Card.  
I'm Kevin's Card.

I'm Kevin's Card.




# Replay: Transaction Counters

- A transaction counter can deter simple replays



# Replay: Transaction Counters

- Under some circumstances counter prevents replay




# Replay: Transaction Counters

- But the counter is not foolproof



# Cross contamination of other payment media

- ▶ New credit card in sealed envelope
- ▶ Scanned with programmable reader
- ▶ Retrieved address from phone book
- ▶ Bought electronics online



# Countermeasures

- Radio shielding
  - ▶ Caution: Does not protect during use



- Recent cards omit cardholder name
  - ▶ Caution: Could lower the bar on other attacks

# Countermeasures

- Better use of cryptography
  - ▶ Not only prevent fraud
  - ▶ But also protect privacy
- Smarter devices (e.g., NFC)
  - ▶ Easier for user to give consent
  - ▶ Capable of much more!



# How to improve privacy

- Consumers need
  - ✓ Justified confidence
    - Not just “security theater”
- Technology must be **open** to public scrutiny
  - ✓ Secure Web sites use **public** methods
    - RFID CCs use **proprietary** methods

# Beware: Academics create insecure RFID too

- Protocol authenticates a tag
- Tag supposed to be hard to clone
- Seems secure in theory:  
40 trillion attempts to crack (centuries)
- But not really:  
3 attempts in practice (seconds)

[“Lightweight Authentication Protocols for Low-Cost RFID Tags” by I. Vajda and L. Buttyan. In UBICOMP, 2003.]


# Conclusions: RFID Security Research

- RFID is neither good nor bad
  - ▶ But should be used properly and responsibly
- RFID credit cards
  - ▶ Personal information disclosed
- Future RFID security and privacy
  - ▶ Better security is coming, but check the fine print

# RFID

Consortium for Security and Privacy

# rfid-cusp.org



The Security Division of EMC

# UMass RFID Research Center



Yanlei Diao  
RFID data management

<http://rfid.cs.umass.edu/>

## UMass Center for Advanced RFID Research



Prashant Shenoy  
RFID software systems

5 faculty + 9 students



Kevin Fu  
RFID security & privacy



Wayne Burleson  
Secure RFID Hardware



Mark Corner  
RFID locationing and  
mobile readers

[rfid-cusp.org](http://rfid-cusp.org)