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Home > Economic Research > Publications and Papers > New England Economic Review
New England Economic Review
Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition

March/April 1997

What behavior can be expected from state and local governments, given market-analogy theories of intergovernmental competition (competition enhances efficiency) and game-theoretic models (competition is destructive)? How does the real world depart from these paradigms? What empirical hypotheses do they imply concerning the effectiveness of alternative competitive public policies? Paper: Daphne A. Kenyon Discussion: Caroline M. Hoxby, Andrew Reschovsky

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