Quarter
1, 2000
by Jane Little
A WORLD OF DIFFICULT CURRENCY CHOICES
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Asked to list major economic policy issues facing the United
States, few U.S. citizens would likely mention the choice
of exchange rate regime. After all, our continental economy
is relatively closed to international trade. Exports plus
imports account for less than 30 percent of U.S. GDP, compared
with 65 to 80 percent for Mexico and Canada, and well over
100 percent for entrepôts like Hong Kong. Moreover,
the prices of many imported commodities like oil and
aluminum are denominated in dollars. Thus, wide swings
in the value of the dollar in terms of other currencies have
no effect on the dollar price of these important imported
inputs to production.
But for many other countries, the choice of currency arrangement
is a crucially important decision one that is being
made, and revised, in a great variety of ways. Should a country
let its currency float freely, with its price in terms of
another currency determined entirely by (erratic) supply and
demand? Or should it try to fix the price of its currency
against that of an important trading partner? Or is a compromise,
a controlled degree of flexibility, possible? Moreover, if
a country does decide to fix or manage, against what currency
should it do so?
In the new world of increasingly open capital markets, many
small and not so small countries have found that flexible
exchange rates can turn volatile and destabilizing. This volatility
discourages trade and investment even between partners
in a free-trade arrangement. Despite NAFTA, trade among the
Canadian provinces and among the U.S. states greatly exceeds
U.S.-Canadian cross-border trade largely because the shifting
exchange rate acts as a barrier.
Big exchange rate swings can also spill over to domestic
prices. Developing countries with a history of high inflation
(like prestabilization Argentina and Brazil) have found that
a weak currency can quickly reignite inflation expectations
as import prices start to rise. But countries with low inflation
have learned that they can attract too much interest from
foreign investors. Feedback between soaring equity or property
prices and a rising exchange rate can create fragile bubbles
in these countries financial markets. Moreover, small
countries are not alone in struggling with unwanted aspects
of flexible rates. Fearing that the strong yen could undermine
Japans budding recovery, the Japanese intervened in
the forex markets many times last year in an effort to depress
their floating exchange rate. Europeans, on the
other hand, have voiced concern about the impact of the weak
euro on inflation.
Given these drawbacks to flexibility, the urge to fix is
strong. But economic history provides ample evidence that
individual country efforts to fix the exchange rate are usually
unsuccessful and often lead to disaster. The Asian crisis
provides the most recent examples, as several currencies were
torn from dollar pegs that had become unsustainable. Basically,
when countries have different economic experiences, different
rates of inflation or productivity growth, say, or when they
have different exposures to economic shocks such as a drought
or an oil price surge, maintaining a fixed exchange rate eliminates
a possible adjustment mechanism. Unless the less competitive
country endures a bout of falling prices or employment, investors
are likely to force an abrupt and disruptively large exchange
rate shift. National monetary authorities hold limited supplies
of foreign currencies to use in stabilizing their own currency
in the foreign exchange market, where transactions amount
to well over $1 trillion a day. So individual monetary authorities
are sitting ducks when private investors decide that a fixed
exchange rate is not sustainable at least so long as
capital markets remain open.
Thus, some countries have decided to seek exchange rate
stability by banding together in currency unions or blocs,
as in the European Monetary Union, or by adopting another
countrys currency and monetary policy as its own. In
the latter case, a few countries, notably Argentina and Hong
Kong, have established a currency board, an arrangement in
which the domestic currency is backed by U.S. dollars (or
euros) and the money supply automatically expands and contracts
with the flow of foreign exchange reserves. Other nations,
like Panama and the members of the CFA Franc Zone, have given
up their domestic currency and use the dollar or the euro
instead. Ecuador has also announced its intent to dollarize
but may find it hard to meet the prerequisites, like strong
banks and disciplined fiscal policy, for such a system. Both
arrangements require a country to forgo monetary policy independence
and make do with limited lender-of-last-resort facilities.
But these small, open countries say that, since they cannot
really hope to have an independent monetary policy in any
event, that loss is a small price to pay for obtaining relative
price stability. And, with the elimination of currency risk
along with the elimination of the domestic currency, they
gain cheaper access to foreign capital.
HOW THE COUNTRIES LINE UP
As shown in the accompanying map, IMF
member countries have distributed themselves rather evenly
along the spectrum from free floats to the irrevocably fixed
rates of a currency union. At the flexible end, 50 countries,
including many economically or physically large nations like
the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, allow their
currency to float independently. However, several members
of this group (Japan, Canada, and Brazil, for instance)
intervene
fairly frequently in an effort to offset disorderly
or unwelcome market forces. Another group of 45 countries
embraces some form of limited flexibility; 26 manage
their float, while 19 allow the exchange rate to fluctuate
within a specified band or to move gradually (crawl)
along a specified path. A further 44 are trying to maintain
a traditional exchange rate peg. Finally, 45 countries have
sought additional stability by joining a currency union
or
by taking a major world currency as their own.
Of course, the map provides a snapshot at a single point
in time. Earlier snapshots would show that the currency turmoil
of the last decade has pushed several countries, like Korea,
Thailand, Brazil, and Colombia, from conventional or crawling
pegs to untethered floats. Indeed, since 1990 the number of
floating currencies has almost doubled, while the number of
conventional pegs has fallen by half. In addition, with the
launch of the euro in early 1999, the group of countries belonging
to currency blocs has jumped significantly, while the group
expressing at least modest interest in currency unions has
grown even more. Indeed, some well-positioned observers, including
Rudi Dornbusch of MIT and Ron McKinnon of Stanford, advocate
the creation of two or three large currency blocs. Harvard's
Richard Cooper imagines the development of a single world
currency in the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES?
From this perspective, the map also shows the evolution
of the euro- and dollar-based currency blocs to date. The
44 countries with links to the dollar (including the U.S.)
account for 38 percent of world output, while the 38 countries
with euro links represent about one-fourth of world product.
Although the euro has weakened against the dollar since its
launch in early 1999, the euro is likely to grow in importance
as a global currency as the European Monetary Union expands
to the east, and as euro financial markets develop. Already,
for a variety of reasons, including novelty, 46 percent of
international debt securities issued in the first three quarters
of 1999 were denominated in euros (versus 45 percent in U.S.
dollars). The euro share was a good deal larger than the combined
shares of the several European currencies in recent years.
But the map also raises questions about the currency bloc
idea. In particular, the map shows little evidence of an emerging
Asian cluster. Many Asian nations trade almost equally with
Japan, Europe, and the United States. So which currency would
be an appropriate nucleus for an Asian currency bloc? Given
time and Asia's history, might the Chinese yuan be a reasonable
candidate? And how are political relations among the members
of a given currency union and between members of major currency
blocs likely to evolve? Will the map of global currency arrangements
begin to merge with the map of geopolitical arrangements?
If so, the choice of currency regime involves yet another
dimension, a dimension that should prompt U.S. citizens to
pay some heed to other countries currency choices.
Acquiring the Map
If you would like us to mail you a copy
of the magazine with the map showing the different exchange
rate systems around
the world, please send us an
e-mail with your postal address and note that you would
like the exchange rates map.
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