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Winter
2004
PDF version
New England
Cloth Production
(thousands of yards) |
| 1826 |
37,072 |
| 1856 |
774,588 |
| Source:
“The New England Textile Industry, 1825-60:
Trends and Fluctuations,” Lance E. Davis
and H. Louis Stettler III. Included in Output,
Employment, and Productivity in the United
States After 1800, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Studies in Income and Wealth,
Vol. 30, 1966. |
|
The name “Abraham Charles” probably doesn’t
ring a bell. There’s really no reason it should.
Mr. Charles came into the world in 1716, spent most
of his years working the land in central Massachusetts,
and died in 1804.
The world he left behind was not so very different
from the one he had entered 88 years earlier. Early
19th century New England was still a mostly rural place
where change came slowly, and tending to the basic necessities
of life took all the time and strength a body could
muster.
Two things set Mr. Charles apart from most of his neighbors:
He survived to the age of 88, and he attained a modest
level of prosperity. But prosperity is a relative condition.
Like almost everyone else in the early 1800s, Abraham
Charles led an austere existence. The inventory of his
estate reads like a list of yard sale remainders: “3
junk bottles,” “1 Iron ring,” and
a “half pint tin cup.” The adjective “old”
— as in 1 old hand saw, 1 old brass kettle, 6
old chairs, and 15 old casks — appears often.
But the most instructive part of the inventory is the
section that catalogs his wardrobe. Here it is —
complete with archaic spelling and a monetary value
for each item:
4 pair stockins |
1.00 |
wollin shirt |
.50 |
Great Coat |
4.00 |
Coat & wescoat |
1.00 |
2 pair of Breeches |
.59 |
old coat |
.25 |
Coat and wescoat |
1.67 |
2 silk Handkercheefs |
1.00 |
1 pair of shirts |
.59 |
1 Gown |
1.25 |
1 Gown |
1.42 |
two aprons |
.60 |
one cloak |
.75 |
5 old Handkercheefs |
.83 |
2 old Handkercheefs |
.25 |
two aprons |
.83 |
| Total Value: |
$16.53 |
The inventory of Abraham
Charles' estate is used courtesy of Jack Larkin, Director
of Research, Collections, and Library at Old Sturbridge
Village. And be sure to check out Ask Jack http://www.osv.org/kids/askjack.htm,
which features Jack Larkin's answers to questions about
New England village life in the early 1800s. Although
it's intended mainly for kids, we're sure adults will
enjoy it, too. In terms of quantity and selection,
the word “meager” comes to mind. And if
you think $16.53 was a lot of money in 1804, well .
. . think again. It had roughly the same purchasing
power that $250 has today.
| HIGHER
PRODUCTIVITY
U.S. Textile Mills
Output per Worker per Year
(yards of cotton cloth) |
| 1820 |
2,000 |
| 1859 |
9,410 |
Output
per Spindle per Year
(yards of cotton cloth) |
| 1820 |
142 |
| 1859 |
219 |
| Source:
“The New England Textile Industry,
1825-60: Trends and Fluctuations,”
Lance E. Davis and H. Louis Stettler
III. Included in Output, Employment,
and Productivity in the United States
After 1800, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Studies in Income and Wealth,
Vol. 30, 1966. |
|
|
| LOWER
PRICES
Wholesale Price of Cotton Sheeting
(per yard) |
| 1814 |
$22.68 |
| 1834 |
8.53 |
| 1854 |
.08 |
Wholesale
Price for Textile Products
(1910-14=100) |
| 1814 |
300 |
| 1834 |
161 |
| 1854 |
124 |
| Source:
U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times
to 1970. |
|
|
Quick Change
The paradox of pre-industrial life — in New England
and elsewhere — was that people toiled endlessly
but seldom had much to show for their efforts. Intense
physical exertion yielded relatively little output.
Basic hand tools and muscle power defined the limits
of production.
Clothing provides a good example. Anyone who’s
ever tried to make clothes knows how time-consuming
the process can be. Today it’s more often a labor
of love than a matter of economic necessity.
But in the early 1800s, cash was scarce and store-bought
goods were expensive, so if you wanted clothes, you
almost always had to make them yourself. Not only would
you have to stitch them by hand — sewing machines
weren’t commercially available until the 1850s
— you’d often have to weave the fabric as
well.
Even in good years, when there was enough extra cash
to spend on clothes, shopping options were limited.
You could:
a) wait for a traveling peddler to stop at your door,
b) buy clothes from a neighbor who could make them
better and faster than you could, or
c) inch your way to town on roads that ranged from
poor to impassable.
But no matter which option you chose, the drawbacks
were the same: high prices and a small selection.
Then came the Industrial Revolution, and within a generation,
life changed forever.
What exactly was the Industrial Revolution? Short answer:
a series of events and improvements that led to an extraordinary
change in the way people produced things. It started
in Europe during the mid- to late- 1700s and spread
to North America in the early 1790s with the opening
of Slater Mill, a Rhode Island textile mill that used
water-powered machinery to spin cotton into yarn in
quantities unmatched by individual spinners working
at home or in small workshops. But Slater Mill was only
a first step. Most finished cloth still had to be woven
on household hand looms — a painstaking process
that yielded relatively little output.
The next major advance came in 1814 when a group of
investors opened America’s first integrated textile
mill in Waltham, Massachusetts — a mill that had
the capacity to spin yarn and weave cloth. Seven years
later, in 1821, another large-scale mill began operation
in Lowell, Massachusetts, and by mid-century the New
England textile industry was producing cloth in quantities
that would have seemed unimaginable 50 years earlier.
(See table: New England Cloth Production.)
But increased production isn’t the same as increased
productivity. It’s possible to boost production
without raising productivity. Take the example of a
textile mill owner who hopes to produce more cloth by
hiring more workers. With the right tools and efficient
organization, the additional workers might help to increase
the mill’s total output, but labor costs would
go up, too, and the money to pay for those added worker-
hours would have to come from somebody’s pocket,
either the mill owner’s or the consumer’s.
The mill’s productivity won’t improve unless
the increase in cloth production is more than enough
to offset the rise in labor costs.
What mill owners really want is to produce more cloth
per workerhour; more cloth for each hour of labor they’re
paying for. That helps to reduce the mill’s per-unit
costs — the cost of producing a yard of cloth
— and lower per-unit costs create the potential
for more good things to happen: 1) higher profits, which
can be shared with workers in the form of higher wages
or reinvested in the mill, and 2) lower prices for consumers.
And that, more or less, is what happened during and
after the Industrial Revolution. Productivity soared,
and prices fell. (See tables: Higher Productivity
and Lower Prices.)
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What Is Real?
The dollar amount on a paycheck — also
known as the nominal wage or money wage
— doesn’t always reflect a person’s
actual buying power. That’s why economists
often focus on the “real” wage,
which more accurately gauges the level of goods
and services a paycheck will buy.
During the second half of the 19th century, most
American workers saw their average money wage
decline. The average “money wage”
for American workers was lower in 1900 than it
was in 1865. But thanks to increased productivity
and the resulting drop in prices, many workers
experienced an increase in real wages.
Average Annual Earnings for Nonfarm Employees
| |
Money
Wage |
Real
Wage |
| 1865 |
$5.12 |
$328 |
| 1900 |
$483 |
$573 |
|
| Source:
U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of
the United States, Colonial Times to 1970. |
More cloth at lower prices ultimately translated into
more clothes at lower prices. At first, that meant more
and better homemade clothes, especially after home sewing
machines became more widely available. But by the early
1900s, American factories were doing their best to meet
a growing demand for ready-made clothing. Department
stores offered city dwellers a dizzying selection. And
the Sears Catalog enticed farm families with page after
page of fabrics and fashions — everything from
denim overalls to silk underwear.
Productivity gains also had an effect on wages, but
in a less straightforward way. During the second half
of the 19th century, the average “money wage”
for American workers actually fell. (See box: What Is
Real?) But in “real” terms, workers had
more buying power. They were able to buy more with the
money they earned — more food, more clothes, more
consumer goods.
Why did real wages go up? In large part, because productivity
increased. Labor-saving machinery, standardized parts,
better organization, improved transportation, and more
efficient capital markets all made it possible for factories
and farms to reduce their per-unit costs. Farmers were
able to produce more bushels of wheat per acre at a
lower cost per bushel and more bales of cotton at a
lower cost per bale. Mills and factories were able to
produce more cloth at a lower cost per yard and more
stockings and pants at a lower cost per pair.
By the end of the 20th century, Americans had reached
the point where clothing accounted for less than five
percent of personal consumption expenditures, yet the
quantity and selection of clothes in most closets was
greater than ever. In fact, if Abraham Charles had died
in 2003 instead of 1804, the inventory of his wardrobe
would have been at least two pages long and his surviving
family members probably would have been scratching their
heads, wondering what to do with all his clothes.
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Your Choice?
In theory, greater productivity and higher real
wages ought to make it possible for people to
work fewer hours, and in fact the average length
of the American work week declined from 60-plus
hours in 1890 to just under 40 hours in 1970.
But since the mid-1970s, the trend seems to have
reversed.
According to Boston College Professor Juliet
Shor, statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
indicate that Americans are working an average
of 12 percent longer today than they were in 1973.
Add to this the fact that the labor participation
rate for U.S. women went from 43.3 percent in
1970 to just over 60 percent in 2000, and you
start to see why there are more and more media
stories on frazzled families and the “overworked
American.”
There have been suggestions that, when it comes
to work and leisure, Americans should try to be
more like Europeans. An article on the CNNMoney
web site — Should America Be France?, October
9, 2003 — noted that “Americans, on
average, work 350 hours more each year than Europeans.”
The article went on to point out that French law
“guarantees workers 11 public holidays,
a minimum of five weeks paid vacation, and a 35-hour
work week.”
Sounds pretty good. But don’t hold your
breath waiting for it to happen in the U.S. Despite
what we say about feeling pressed for time, Americans
seem inclined to take their productivity gains
in the form of more stuff rather than more leisure
time. Given the choice, they’ll tend to
work more and spend more, rather than work less
and spend less.
The one exception: If you’re among the
legion of low-wage American workers who put in
long hours for short money, you don’t really
have a choice. You just work, and work, and work
. . . and hope you don’t fall too far behind. |
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